Universality, Invariance, and the Foundations of Computational Complexity in the light of the Quantum Computer by Cuffaro, Michael E.
Universality, Invariance, and the Foundations of Computational
Complexity in the light of the Quantum Computer∗,†
Michael E. Cuffaroa,b
aRotman Institute of Philosophy, University of Western Ontario
bMunich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
1 Introduction
Computational complexity theory is a branch of computer science that is dedicated to classifying
computational problems in terms of their difficulty. Unlike computability theory, whose object is to
determine what we can compute in principle, the object of complexity theory1 is to inform us with
regards to our practical limits. It thus serves as a natural conceptual bridge between the study of
mathematics and the study of technology, in the sense that computational complexity theory
∗Note: this is the submitted version of a chapter that is to appear in the book Technology
and Mathematics: Philosophical and Historical Investigations (Springer-Verlag), Sven Ove Hansson
(ed.). There may be changes made in the published version which are not reflected in this preprint.
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†This project was supported financially by the Foundational Questions Institute (FQXi) and by the
Rotman Institute of Philosophy. I am grateful to Scott Aaronson, Walter Dean, William Demopoulos,
Armond Duwell, Laura Felline, Sona Ghosh, Amit Hagar, Gregory Lavers, and Markus Müller for
their comments on a previous draft of this chapter. It has improved substantially as a result.
1There are a number of sciences (for example: complex systems theory, the study of
Kolmogorov complexity, and so on) which are referred to as complexity theories. Unless otherwise
noted, any occurrence of ‘complexity theory’ in what follows should be understood as referring in
particular to computational complexity theory, and any conclusions made should be taken as
pertaining only to it.
informs us with respect to which computational procedures may reasonably be expected to be
technologically feasible.
Quantum computer science is the study of algorithms and other aspects of computer systems
whose construction involves an explicit appeal to various features of quantum physical theory.
Strikingly, there are quantum algorithms that appear to significantly outperform algorithms which
do not take advantage of quantum resources. What distinguishes, quantitatively, quantum from
classical computation is not the number of problems that can be solved using one or the other
model. Rather, what distinguishes the quantum from the classical model of computation is that
the number of problems solvable efficiently—i.e. the number of problems whose solution is
practically realisable—in the former model appears to be larger than the number of problems
solvable efficiently in the latter. The study of quantum computer science therefore advances the
goal of complexity theory in the sense that it adds to our knowledge of the class of practically
realisable computational procedures.
More generally, as I will argue below, the study of quantum computation illuminates the very
nature and subject matter of complexity theory. Yet it does not do so in a way that is often
claimed. In particular it is not uncommon to come across statements in the philosophical and
scientific literature to the effect that advances in quantum computing force a fundamental revision
of the foundations of complexity theory (Hagar, 2007; Nielsen & Chuang, 2000;
Bernstein & Vazirani, 1997). According to this view it is the traditional aim of complexity theory
to understand the nature of concepts such as that of a ‘tractable problem’ in themselves; i.e.,
apart from the manner in which they are implemented under particular models of computation.
Model-independence, in turn, is taken to rest upon an ‘extended’ or ‘strong’ version of the
Church-Turing thesis, or alternately, upon an ‘invariance’ thesis. And because quantum computers
seemingly violate these theses, it is concluded that complexity theory’s foundations must be
somehow rebuilt.
As I will argue, however, model-independence is not and never has been at the core of
computational complexity theory. Its foundations are therefore not shaken by the advent of
quantum computing. Complexity theory is fundamentally a practical science, whose aim is to guide
us in making distinctions in practice among tractable and intractable problem sets. The
model-independence of complexity-theoretic concepts is not a necessary condition for realising this
aim. Quantum computation indeed illuminates the subject matter of complexity theory. But it
does not do so by overturning its foundations. Rather, quantum computing illuminates complexity
theory by reminding us of its practical nature.
This is both a virtue of the theory as well as a reason for increased philosophical attention to it.
Science does not always or only, or perhaps ever, progress through the absolute identification of
fundamental entities, be they abstract or concrete. Complexity theory furnishes us with a
particularly striking illustration that scientific progress—even in the mathematical sciences—is, in
fact, often built upon pragmatically justified foundations and conceptual structures.2 There is a
general philosophical lesson in this, which in different contexts has been profitably analysed by
some (for example, Carnap 1980 [1950]; 1962, ch. 1), though in my view too few, philosophers.
In the next section we will briefly review, from a historical perspective, the foundations of
computability theory. §3 will then connect the foregoing discussion to the foundations of
computational complexity theory, and will introduce the theory’s basic concepts. In §4 we will
discuss the ‘universality of Turing efficiency’ thesis, as well as the closely related ‘invariance thesis’.
§5 will introduce the basic concepts of quantum computing. In §6 we will discuss quantum
computing’s significance for the conceptual foundations of complexity theory. We will then
conclude.
2 The Entscheidungsproblem and the origins of the Church-Turing thesis
With his second incompleteness theorem, Gödel demonstrated that any ω-consistent formalisation
of number theory, whose formulas are primitively recursively definable, and which is rich enough to
permit arithmetisation of syntax, cannot prove its own consistency.3 For such a capability would
be incompatible with Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem, by which he demonstrated that within
any such formalisation there are sentences neither provable nor refutable from the axioms. Finding
a general and effective procedure for determining whether a given formula in such a system is one
of these sentences, however, remained an open question.
This was the Decision Problem—in German: the Entscheidungsproblem—for validity, originally
posed for first-order logic by (Hilbert & Ackermann, 1928, Pt. III); that is, to describe an ‘effective
procedure’ by which one can decide whether an arbitrarily given expression of first-order logic is
provable from the axioms.4 Informally, an effective computational procedure consists of a finite
2See also Dean (2016a), who reviews the arguably insurmountable problems that face any
attempt to regard an algorithm as a mathematical object in the light of computer science practice.
3An ω-consistent theory is such that it is both consistent and satisfies a syntactic analogue of
soundness (see Dawson Jr., 2007, p. 504). A primitively recursively definable formula is such that
it can be built up from a finite number of successive basic operations. Arithmetisation of syntax
refers to a procedure by which every sentence in a formal system is encoded uniquely into a
natural number (called its ‘Gödel number’).
4The reason for Hilbert & Ackermann’s focus on the special case of first order logic is that it is
number of precise finite-length instructions guaranteed to produce some desired result in a finite
number of steps if followed exactly by a human being using nothing other than paper and pencil.
An example of an effective procedure is the truth-table method as applied to sentential logic.
Famously, Church and Turing were independently able to show that the Entscheidungsproblem for
first-order logic could not be solved; i.e., no effective calculational procedure for determining the
validity of an arbitrarily given expression in first-order logic exists.
Turing, to whom we will restrict our attention, showed this partly by means of a penetrating
philosophical analysis of the notion of effective computation.5 Turing (1937, pp. 249–51) argued
that it is essential to the idea of carrying out a computation that the computer uses a notebook
from which she reads, and onto which she writes, various symbols related to her work. These
symbols, as they must be distinguishable from one another, are chosen from a finite alphabet. At
any given moment during a computation, the computer will find herself in one of a finite number
of relevant states of mind which summarise her memory of the actions she has performed up until
that point along with her awareness of what she must now do (see pp. 253–4). The actions that
are available to her are characterised by a finite set of elementary operations, such as ‘read the
next symbol’ from the notebook, ‘write symbol a’ to the notebook, and so on. Turing then argued
that one could design an automatic machine, which he called an α-machine, to instantiate each of
these essential features of the practice of human computation (see Figure 1). In doing so he
identified the concept ‘effectively calculable’ with the concept of ‘computable by α-machine’. This
identification is known as Turing’s thesis, which he proved (p. 263ff) to be equivalent with
Church’s independently arrived at thesis that the class of effectively calculable functions is
identical with the class of λ-definable functions (Church, 1936). For this reason it is also called the
Church-Turing thesis.
Turing then addressed the Entscheidungsproblem in an indirect way (Turing 1937, pp. 259–63,
Turing 1938). He first showed that it is impossible to determine, for a given α-machine, whether it
the most restricted example of a general logic adequate for representing higher arithmetic, i.e.
number theory. Its study was to constitute the first step in the development of a more
encompassing logical framework for mathematics (Dawson Jr., 2007, p. 500). Note that Hilbert
and Ackermann additionally posed a parallel Decision Problem for satisfiability. In the sequel,
unless otherwise indicated, I will take the Decision Problem or Entscheidungsproblem to refer
exclusively to the problem for validity.
5In what follows it must be kept in mind that computation, at the time of the publication of
“On Computable Numbers,” generally referred to an activity performed by human beings; a
computer was a person employed to carry out computations.
Figure 1: A version of what is now called a ‘Turing machine’. The control unit houses the
machine’s ‘state of mind’, which in general changes after every operation of the read-write head.
The read-write head reads, writes, and moves back and forth along portions of a one-dimensional
tape (the machine’s ‘notebook’). Such a machine is an idealised representation of the components
involved in human computation.
is ‘circle-free’; i.e. whether it is not the case that it never outputs more than a finite number of
symbols. He then showed that if the Entscheidungsproblem were solvable, one could determine, for
any given α-machine, whether it is circle-free. Since this contradicts the first result, the
Entscheidungsproblem is unsolvable.
3 Efficient computation
The period just discussed, during which the seminal papers by Church, Gödel, Turing, and others
were published, is the period of the birth of computer science in the modern sense. It was to be
nearly three more decades before the particular branch of modern computer science that furnishes
the subject matter for this chapter, computational complexity theory, took shape with the work of
Cobham (1965), Edmonds (1965), Hartmanis & Stearns (1965), and others. Yet one of its key
questions was anticipated significantly earlier by none other than Gödel. Revisiting the
Entscheidungsproblem in a letter he wrote to von Neumann in 1956, Gödel asked for von
Neumann’s opinion concerning the number, ϕ(l), of steps needed, in the worst case, to decide
whether some arbitrarily given formula of first-order logic has a proof of length l. In his letter
Gödel asks:6 “how fast does ϕ(l) grow for an optimal [Turing] machine?” He notes that “One can
show that ϕ(l) ≥ Kl” (for some constant K), and then asserts:
If there actually were a machine with ϕ(l) ∼ Kl (or even only with ∼ Kl2), this would
have consequences of the greatest magnitude. That is to say, it would clearly indicate
6In the following quotations I have replaced the variable n with l.
that, despite the unsolvability of the Entscheidungsproblem, the mental effort of the
mathematician in the case of yes-or-no questions could be completely [Gödel’s
Footnote: Apart from the postulation of axioms] replaced by machines. One would
indeed have to simply select an l so large that, if the machine yields no result, there
would then also be no reason to think further about the problem (Gödel, 1956, p. 10).
To illustrate: take some proposition F of first-order logic and consider testing to see whether F
has a proof, Ψ, of length l. Let l be a number of steps far too large for any unaided human being
to survey in a lifetime, but small enough that a machine could survey them all relatively quickly.
Gödel’s point is that, from the machine’s perspective, the Kl (or perhaps Kl2) steps needed to
discover whether Ψ exists is not very much greater than the l steps that would be needed to
survey it. We would expect, therefore, that the machine will give us an answer to the question of
whether F has a proof of length l in a reasonable amount of time. By assumption, however,
surveying a proof of length ≥ l is beyond the practical capabilities of any human being. So if the
machine yields a negative result, then we can conclusively say that, for the practical purposes of
unaided human computation, F is unprovable. Indeed there would be no reason to bother with the
practical computational purposes of unaided human mathematicians at all; if such a machine
existed we could henceforth consider such questions exclusively with respect to it.
There is an additional, deeper, point that is implicit here as well. Gödel’s question to von
Neumann is stated in the context of the Entscheidungsproblem, where it is assumed that the
procedure to be used by a human mathematician to answer the question of whether F can be
proved is an effective one, in the sense described in the previous section. Recall that following an
effective procedure requires no ingenuity on the part of the person doing the following; it is a
purely mechanical procedure which, if followed exactly, is guaranteed to give one a result in a finite
number of steps. It is precisely for this reason that we can model it with a machine. In general,
however, theorem proving is an activity which we do take to require insight and ingenuity. We take
there to be more to the process of discovering a proof of a particular theorem than blindly
following a set of rules; we need insight into the ‘essential nature’ of the problem at hand in order
to guide us to the most likely route to a solution, and we need ingenuity to proceed along this
route in a skillful, efficient, way. Or so one could object. Be that as it may, if we could in fact
build a machine to discover, in only Kl (or Kl2) steps, whether any given proposition of first-order
logic has a proof of length l, it would make, not just human beings themselves, but the ingenuity
and insight associated with their activities in this context, dispensable.
Implicit in the above considerations is the idea that neither ϕ(l) ∼ Kl nor ϕ(l) ∼ Kl2 yields a
significantly greater number than l from the point of view of a machine. This is consistent with
the ideas of modern complexity theory, where in fact any decision problem (i.e., yes-or-no
question) for which a solution exists whose worst-case running time is bounded by as much as a
polynomial function of its input size, n, is considered to be a ‘tractable’ (a.k.a. ‘feasible’,
‘efficiently solvable’, ‘easy’, etc.7) problem. Indeed, these ideas are not just consistent; one way to
motivate the modern complexity-theoretic identification is to begin with essentially Gödel’s
assertion that problems which require only Kn or Kn2 steps to solve are tractable.8 Combine this
with the computer programmer’s intuition that an efficient program, to which one adds a call to
an efficient subroutine, should continue to be thought of as efficient (Arora & Barak, 2009, p. 27),
and we naturally arrive at the conclusion that the set of efficiently solvable problems just is the set
of problems solvable in a polynomial number of time steps. This ‘polynomial principle’ is generally
considered to be at the heart of the theory of computational complexity. We will discuss it in more
detail (and critically) in §6.
In the context of the Turing machine (TM) model, the set of decision problems solvable in
polynomial time is referred to as the class P.9 More formally, we can conceive of a decision
problem as one whose goal is to yield a yes-or-no answer to the question of whether a given string
x of length n is a member of the ‘language’ L. For example, the decision problem for determining
whether a given number is prime can be represented as the problem to determine, for an arbitrarily
given binary string, whether it is a member of the language {10, 11, 101, 111, 1011, 1101, 10001,
10011, . . . } (the set of binary representations of prime numbers). Now call a given language L a
member of the class DTIME(T (n)) iff there is a Turing machine10 for deciding membership in L
whose running time, t(n), is ‘on the order of T (n)’, or in symbols: O(T (n)). Here, T (n)
represents an upper bound for the growth rate of t(n) in the sense that, by definition, t(n) is
O(T (n)) if for every sufficiently large n, t(n) ≤ k · T (n) for some constant k.11 So for any
7I will be using these terms interchangeably below.
8Note that although Gödel’s letter to von Neumann anticipates this and other ideas of modern
complexity theory, I am not claiming that it actually influenced the theory’s development. As far
as I am aware, Gödel’s letter was unknown prior to its translation and publication in Sipser (1992).
9It is also sometimes referred to as PTIME, in order to emphasise the distinction between it
and PSPACE, the class of problems solvable using space resources bounded by a polynomial
function of n.
10The ‘D’ in DTIME stands for ‘deterministic’. It contrasts with ‘nondeterministic time’, which I
will introduce later.
11The qualification ‘for every sufficiently large n’ can be rephrased as the assertion that there
exists some finite n0 ≥ 1 such that t(n) ≤ k · T (n) whenever n ≥ n0.
language L in, for example, DTIME(n2), there is a TM that will take no more than kn2 steps to
decide membership in L. We can now formally characterise P as (Arora & Barak, 2009, p. 25):
P =
⋃
k≥1
DTIME(nk). (1)
Note that the class DTIME(T (n)) is defined, strictly speaking, to be a set of languages. Below I
will sometimes use statements of the form: ‘(decision) problem R is in DTIME(T (n))’, which is
shorthand for the assertion that the language LR, associated with R, is decidable in O(T (n))
steps.
We have just seen that L is in P iff one can construct a polynomial-time TM that will decide,
for any given x, whether x ∈ L. Now suppose that one is presented with a proof that x ∈ L. If
one can verify this proof using a polynomial-time TM, then we say that L is a member of the
complexity class NP.12 More formally (Arora & Barak, 2009, p. 39),
L ∈ NP whenever: x ∈ L⇔ ∃u s.t. M(x, u) poly= ‘yes’, (2)
where u is string (usually called a ‘certificate’) whose length is given by a polynomial function of
the length, n, of x, and M(x, u)
poly
= ‘yes’ asserts that the machine M accepts x, given u, in
polynomial time.13
The restricted form of the Entscheidungsproblem described above by Gödel is certainly in NP;
given a proposition x, and a proof u of x whose length is ≤ l, one can obviously verify this in
polynomial time. Indeed, the problem also happens to be ‘NP-complete’ (Hartmanis, 1993).14
NP-complete problems are the hardest problems in NP, in the sense that if we have in hand a
solution to an NP-complete problem, we can easily convert it into a solution to any other problem
in NP. That is, a language L ∈ NP is in the class NP-complete iff a procedure for deciding L can
be converted, in polynomial time, into a procedure for deciding L′, for any L′ ∈ NP. More
concisely, L ∈ NP is NP-complete iff ∀L′ ∈ NP , L′ is polynomial-time reducible, in the above
sense,15 to L (Arora & Barak, 2009, p. 42).
12NP stands for nondeterministic polynomial time. The reason for this name will become clear
shortly.
13u must be of polynomial length in n to ensure that M can read u in polynomial time.
14Gödel himself gives no indication that he realises this in his letter.
15What I have described above is actually called a Karp reduction. It is a weaker concept than
the related one of Cook reduction. We will not discuss the distinction here. For more on this, see
The proposition that there exists a general solution to the restricted Entscheidungsproblem
which requires no more than Kl2 steps to carry out—call this the ‘Gödelian conjecture’16—does
not amount merely to the proposition that this decision problem is in NP. Recall that the
restricted Entscheidungsproblem is the problem to decide whether an arbitrarily given formula x
has a proof of length l; it is not merely the problem of verifying this fact about x given a
certificate u. The Gödelian conjecture, therefore, amounts to the claim that the restricted
Entscheidungsproblem is in P. But since this problem is known to be NP-complete, the Gödelian
conjecture, if correct, amounts to the claim that P = NP.17
Interestingly, there has been no proof or disproof to date of the statement that P = NP. Partly
due to the intuitive implausibility of its consequences—that “the mental effort of the
mathematician in the case of yes-or-no questions could be completely replaced by machines”
(Gödel, 1956)—the statement is generally believed to be false. Besides this there are further,
mathematical, reasons to believe that P 6= NP (Aaronson, 2013a, p. 67). I will not mention these
here as the P = NP question is not our focus. I will only say that the project to prove or disprove
P = NP is a worthwhile one, not so much because the outcome is in doubt, but because a formal
proof would likely enlighten us with regards to just what it is that insight and ingenuity contribute
to the practice of mathematics.
Our discussion of the Turing machine model of computation has thus far focused on the
standard, i.e., deterministic, case. A standard TM is such that its behaviour at any given moment
in time is wholly determined by the state that it finds itself in plus whatever input it receives. The
machine can be fully characterised, that is, by a unique transition function over the domain of
states and input symbols. One can, however, generalise the TM model by allowing the machine to
instantiate more than one transition function simultaneously.18 Upon being presented with a given
input in a given state, a nondeterministic Turing machine (NTM) is allowed to ‘choose’ which of
its transition functions to follow (see Figure 2). Exactly how this choice is made is left undefined,
Aaronson (2013a, p. 58).
16Gödel does not himself actually conjecture this, although he comes close to doing so: “it seems
to me ... to be totally within the realm of possibility that ϕ(l) grows slowly.” (Gödel, 1956, p. 10).
17Strictly speaking it only entails that NP ⊆ P. But since obviously P ⊆ NP, it would follow that
P = NP.
18The idea of a machine with an ambiguous transition function can be found in Turing (1937).
Turing calls this a ‘choice machine’ (p. 232), and notes its extensional equivalence with the
automatic (i.e. deterministic) machine (p. 252, footnote ‡).
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δ1(Start, 0) = (a, 0, R) δ2(Start, 0) = (b, 0, R)
δ1(Start, 1) = (Start, 1, R) δ2(Start, 1) = (Start, 1, R)
etc. etc.
Figure 2: A nondeterministic Turing machine (NTM) is such that, for a given state and a given
input, the state transitioned to is not predetermined; at any given step the machine is able select
from more than one transition function (in this case, δ1 and δ2). The machine depicted accepts
binary strings ending in ‘00’, since there exists a series of transitions for which, given such a string,
the machine will end in the ‘Accept’ state. But it is not guaranteed to do so. The machine
additionally is guaranteed to reject any string not ending in ‘00’. In the diagram, an edge from s1
to s2 with the label α, β, P is read as: In state s1, the machine reads α from its tape, writes β to
the tape in the same position, moves its read/write head along the tape to the position P with
respect to the current tape position (L = to the left, R = to the right, S = same), and finally
transitions to state s2.
and for the purposes of the model can be thought of as arbitrary. We say that an NTM accepts a
string x iff there exists a path through its state space that, given x, leads to an accepting state. It
rejects x otherwise. We define the class NTIME(T (n)), analogously to DTIME(T (n)), as the set
of languages for which there exists an NTM that will decide, in O(T (n)) steps, whether a given
string x of length n is in the language L.
Recall that above I characterised NP as the set of languages for which one can construct a
polynomial-time TM to verify, for any x, that x ∈ L, given a polynomial-length certificate u for x.
One can alternatively characterise NP as the set of languages for which there exists a
polynomial-time NTM for determining membership in L:
NP =df
⋃
k≥1
NTIME(nk). (3)
This definition is the source of the name NP, in fact, which stands for ‘nondeterministic
polynomial time’.
Defs. (2) and (3) are equivalent. Given a language L and a polynomial-time NTM that decides
it, then for any x ∈ L, there is by definition a polynomial-length sequence of transitions of the
NTM which will accept x. One can use this sequence as a certificate for x, and verify it in
polynomial-time using a (deterministic) TM. Conversely, suppose there is a TM MD that, given a
polynomial-length certificate u for x, can verify in polynomial time that x ∈ L. Then one can
construct a polynomial-time NTM MN that will ‘choose’ certificates from among the set of
possible polynomial-length strings (e.g., by randomly writing one down). Upon choosing a
certificate u, MN then calls MD to verify x given u, and transitions to ‘yes’ only if MD outputs
‘yes’ (Arora & Barak, 2009, p. 42).
For an NTM, no attempt is made to define how such a computer chooses, at any given
moment, whether to follow one transition function rather than another. In particular, it is not
assumed that any probabilities are attached to the machine’s choices. Indeed, under Turing’s
original conception (1937, p. 232), these are thought of as the choices of an external operator.
They are thus arbitrary from the machine’s point of view. In a probabilistic Turing machine
(PTM), on the other hand, we characterise the computer’s choices by associating a particular
probability with each of its transitions (see Figure 3).
Like TMs and NTMs, PTMs have associated with them a number of complexity classes. The
most important of these is the class BPP (bounded-error probabilistic polynomial time). This is
the class of languages such that there exists a polynomial-time PTM that, on any given run, will
correctly determine whether or not a string x is in the language L with probability ≥ 2/3. The
particular threshold value of 2/3 is inessential to this definition. It is chosen in order to express the
idea of a ‘high probability’.19 But any threshold probability pmin ≥ 1/2 + n−k, where k is a
constant, will suffice for the definition of BPP. For given a polynomial-time PTM that correctly
determines whether or not x ∈ L with probability pmin, re-running it a number of additional times
that is no more than polynomial in n and taking the majority answer will yield a correct result with
19Note that the high probability requirement constitutes a key conceptual difference between
BPP and NP. The latter demands only that it is possible for an NTM to arrive at a correct
solution.
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Figure 3: One node in a PTM. Given an input of 1 in the state a, the machine will write 1 to the
tape and move right with probability 4/5, or write 0 and move left with probability 1/5. On an
input of 0 it will write 0 and move right with probability 3/8, or write 0 and move left with
probability 5/8. For a given state and a given input, edge probabilities must add up to 1. We can
imagine that the machine’s choices are made in accordance with these probabilities by repeatedly
‘flipping a coin’.
probability close to 1 (Arora & Barak, 2009, p. 132). Since, as I mentioned above, the time it
takes to run a polynomial-time algorithm a polynomial number of times is still polynomial, varying
pmin in this way will do nothing to alter the set of languages contained in BPP.
4 The universality and invariance theses
The Church-Turing (C-T) thesis claims nothing about the efficiency of any particular model of
computation. Nor does it carry with it any implications concerning physically possible computing
machines in general (see Turing, 1950, §§3, 5, 6.7). Both Church’s and Turing’s theses are, as we
saw earlier, theses concerning the limits of effective procedures. Despite this, the C-T thesis is
often misrepresented in this regard in the philosophical and even in the scientific literature (for
further discussion of the reasons for the confusion, see Copeland, 2015; Timpson, 2013; Pitowsky,
1990). In more informed literature, however, these re-interpretations of the C-T thesis are
explicitly distinguished from it. The thesis (I) that any reasonable model of computation can be
simulated with at most a polynomial number of extra time steps by a PTM is often called the
‘strong’ C-T thesis (see, e.g., Nielsen & Chuang, 2000, p. 140).20 ,21 The thesis (II) that a physical
instantiation of a TM can simulate any physically possible machine that realises a finite instruction
set and that works on finite data is often called the ‘physical’ C-T thesis (Andréka et al.,
Forthcoming; Piccinini, 2011). But confusingly, (II) is also sometimes called the ‘strong’ thesis
(Goldin & Wegner, 2008), and (I) is sometimes called the ‘physical’ thesis (Hagar, 2007).
So as not to contribute to the confusion arising from this ambiguous labelling, and more
importantly, to discourage any erroneous inferences to the intended scope of Church’s and Turing’s
original theses themselves, I will, following Gandy (1980), refer to (II) as ‘Thesis M’. I will refer to
(I), the subject of this section, as the ‘universality of Turing efficiency thesis’. For it follows from
the truth of (I) that the set of problems efficiently solvable in general, i.e., on any reasonable
digital machine model M, is identical with the set of problems efficiently solvable on a PTM.
Formally this can be expressed as:
⋃
PolyM = BPP. (4)
In other words, the thesis implies that the set of problems solvable in polynomial time does not
grow beyond BPP if we allow ourselves to vary the underlying model.22
20Some textbooks state (I) as a thesis about the TM rather than the PTM model (see, e.g.,
Arora & Barak, 2009, p. 26). I will follow Nielsen & Chuang (2000), in order to leave open the
possibility that P ( BPP, and also because BPP constitutes a more natural contrast (see fn. 22
below) with its quantum analogue, BQP, which we will introduce in the next section. Until
recently, P ( BPP was thought to be very likely true, however evidence (e.g., Agrawal et al.,
2004) has been mounting in favour of the conjecture that in fact P = BPP. Whether (I) is
formulated with respect to TMs or PTMs makes little difference to what follows. A TM can be
thought of as a special case of a PTM for which transition probabilities are always either 0 or 1.
21The qualification ‘reasonable’ will be explained shortly.
22There is a slight complication that I am glossing over here, namely that what it means for a
machine to constitute a solution to a problem varies across computational models. In particular a
TM solution to a problem is required to yield a correct answer with certainty, whereas (as I
mentioned previously) a PTM solution in general need only yield a correct answer with probability
close to 1. Implicit in (4), therefore, is an appeal to the more general criterion for solvability
corresponding to that appropriate to a PTM rather than to a TM. This subtle distinction
regarding what it means to solve a problem under various models of computation is one reason,
that I alluded to in fn. 20 above, for expressing the universality thesis in terms of BPP rather than
A further closely related notion is what van Emde Boas (1990, p. 5) has called the ‘invariance
thesis’. This states that any reasonable machine model can simulate any other reasonable machine
model with no more than a polynomial slowdown (see also: Goldreich 2008, p. 33, who names it
differently). The invariance thesis implies the universality thesis, but not vice versa. Note that in
the context of both the universality and invariance theses, ‘reasonable’ is typically understood as
physically realisable. Reasonable models include variants of the TM model, for example, but do
not include models which employ unbounded parallelism.23 This will be discussed further in §6.
There are reasons for believing in the truth of both the universality and invariance theses.
Neither the standard variations on the Turing model, such as adding more tapes, increasing the
number of squares readable or writable at a given moment, and so on (Arora & Barak, 2009), nor
the alternative reasonable universal (classical) models of computation that have been developed
since Turing’s work, are faster than PTMs by more than a polynomial factor, and all appear to be
able to simulate one another efficiently in this sense (van Emde Boas, 1990).
Over the last three decades, however, evidence has nevertheless been mounting against
universality and invariance, primarily as a result of the advent of quantum computing (Aaronson,
2013a, chs. 10, 15). We will discuss quantum computing in more detail in the next section.
5 Quantum computation
Consider the (non-quantum) machine depicted in Figure 4. This simple automaton has two
possible states: {0, 1}. It has one possible input (omitted in the state-transition diagram), which
essentially instructs the machine to ‘run’. This can be implemented, for example, by a button
connected to the machine’s inner mechanism. At the end of any given run, the machine will either
remain in the state it was previously in or else transition to the opposite state, with equal
probability. One can imagine that the machine also includes a small door which, when opened,
reveals a display indicating what state the machine is in. A typical session with the machine
consists in: (a) opening the door to record the machine’s initial state; (b) pushing the ‘run’ button
one or more times; (c) opening the door to reveal the machine’s final state.
Let us suppose that between the initial and final opening of the door, our experimenter pushes
P. For as we will see in the next section, a quantum computer, like a PTM, is a probabilistic
machine and is subject to the same criterion for success. Expressing the universality thesis in terms
of BPP thus allows for a more straightforward analysis of the quantum model’s significance for the
thesis. A similar remark applies to the invariance thesis, which I now introduce.
23The parallel random access machine (PRAM) model, for example, is excluded.
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Figure 4: A simple automaton which, when run, randomly transitions to one of two possible
states. In the state-transition diagram at the left, edge labels represent probabilities for the
indicated transitions.
the button twice. Given that the initial reading was 0, what is the probability that the final reading
is 0 as well? This is given by:
Pr(C20→ 0) = Pr(C0→ 0)× Pr(C0→ 0)
+ Pr(C0→ 1)× Pr(C1→ 0)
= 1/2, (5)
where Cnψ → φ signifies that the computer is run n times after beginning in the state ψ, and
ends in φ. Eq. (5) illustrates that there are two possible ways for the computer to begin and end
in the state 0 after two runs. Either it remains in 0 after each individual run, or else it first flips to
1 and then flips back. From Figure 4, one can easily see that:
Pr(C20→ 0) = Pr(C20→ 1) = Pr(C21→ 0) = Pr(C21→ 1) = 1/2, (6)
and indeed we have that Pr(Cnψ → φ) = 1/2 for any n.
The internal state (what is revealed by opening the door) of the simple machine pictured in
Figure 4 is describable by a single binary digit, or ‘bit’. In general the internal state of any classical
digital computer is describable by a sequence of n bits, and likewise for its inputs and outputs. A
bit can be directly instantiated by any two-level classical physical system, for example by a circuit
that can be either open or closed. In a quantum computer, on the other hand, the basic unit of
representation is not the bit but the qubit. To directly instantiate it, we can use a two-level
quantum system such an electron (specifically: its spin). The qubit generalises the bit. Like a bit,
it can be ‘on’, i.e. in the state |0〉, or ‘off’, i.e. in the state |1〉. In general, however, the state of a
qubit can be expressed as a normalised linear superposition:
|ψ〉 = α|0〉+ β|1〉, (7)
where the ‘amplitudes’ α and β are complex numbers such that |α|2 + |β|2 = 1. We refer to |ψ〉
as the ‘state vector’ for the qubit.24
An important difference between qubits and bits is that not all states of a qubit can be observed
directly; in particular, one never observes a qubit in a linear superposition (aside from the trivial
case in which one of α, β is 0).25 According to the Born rule, a qubit in the state (7), when
measured, will be found to be in the state |0〉 with probability |α|2, and in the state |1〉 with
probability |β|2. For example, consider a simple one-qubit quantum machine that implements the
following transitions:
Q|0〉 → i√
2
|0〉+ 1√
2
|1〉 ≡ |χ〉, (8)
Q|1〉 → 1√
2
|0〉+ i√
2
|1〉 ≡ |ξ〉. (9)
If the machine begins in the state |0〉, and the button is pushed once, it will transition to |χ〉. Then
with probability | i√
2
|2, opening the door will reveal |0〉, and with probability | 1√
2
|2 it will reveal |1〉.
Since | i√
2
|2 = | 1√
2
|2 = 1/2, a series of ‘one-push’ experiments with this quantum machine will
produce identical statistics as will a series of one-push experiments with the classical machine
depicted in Figure 4. Things become more interesting when we consider two-push experiments. If
the machine is in the initial state |0〉, then after the first push the machine will effect the
transition (8). If, before opening the door, we push the button again, the machine will make the
24The modulus squared (or ‘absolute square’), |c|2, of a complex number c is given by cc¯, where
c¯ is the complex conjugate of c. |ψ〉 is normalised when |α|2 + |β|2 = 1.
25To be more precise: one never observes a qubit in a linear superposition with respect to a
particular measurement basis. Generally, in quantum computing, measurements are carried out in
the computational, i.e. {|0〉, |1〉}, basis. In this basis the superposition (|0〉 + |1〉)/√2, for
example, can never be the result of a measurement. If one measures in the {|+〉, |−〉} basis,
however, then such a result is possible, since |+〉 = (|0〉 + |1〉)/√2. On the other hand, a
measurement in the {|+〉, |−〉} basis will never yield the result |0〉 = (|+〉+ |−〉)/√2 even though
a result of |0〉 is possible in the computational basis.
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Figure 5: A simple quantum computer. With each button push, the machine deterministically
oscillates, via the transition Q, between the states |0〉, |χ〉, |1〉, |ξ〉 in the manner depicted. When
the door is opened, the machine undergoes the ‘measurement’ transition M . This results, when
the computer is in one of the states |χ〉 and |ξ〉, in a reading of |0〉 or |1〉 with equal probability.
Opening the door when the machine is in either |0〉 or |1〉 has no effect on the computer’s state.
following transition:
Q
( i√
2
|0〉+ 1√
2
|1〉
)
=
i√
2
Q|0〉 + 1√
2
Q|1〉
= −1
2
|0〉+ i
2
|1〉 + 1
2
|0〉+ i
2
|1〉 = i|1〉. (10)
Since |i|2 = 1, opening the door will find the machine in the state |1〉 with certainty. Likewise, if
the machine begins in |1〉, a two-push experiment will find it in the state |0〉 with certainty. A
state transition diagram for the quantum machine is given in Figure 5.26
The probabilities for outcomes of two-push experiments with the quantum computer Q are
significantly different from those associated with two-push experiments on C. This is despite the
fact that if one performs two (or in general n) repetitions of a one-push experiment (i.e. in which
one opens the door after every button push), the resulting statistics will be identical for both C
and Q. One can think of a one-push experiment with C or Q as instantiating a ‘maximally noisy’
26Note that overall phase factors have been abstracted away from in Figure 5. Two normalised
state vectors which differ only in their overall phase factor yield all of the same probabilities for
outcomes of experiments and are considered as equivalent according to quantum theory. For
example, all of these express the same physical state: |ψ〉, −|ψ〉, i|ψ〉, −i|ψ〉. Local phase factors,
however, are important; |0〉+|1〉√
2
and |0〉−|1〉√
2
, for example, are different states.
(i.e. completely useless) NOT-gate. With a two-push experiment on Q, however, we have
instantiated a perfect NOT-gate. We cannot do anything analogous with C.
The foregoing was a simple—almost trivial—illustration of some of the basic differences
between classical and quantum computation. But by taking advantage of these and other
differences, researchers have been able to develop quantum algorithms to achieve results that seem
impossible for a classical computer. Quantum computers cannot solve non-Turing-computable
problems (see Hagar & Korolev, 2007). However, as we will discuss shortly, quantum computers
are able to efficiently solve problems that have no known efficient classical solution. This apparent
ability of quantum computers to outperform classical computers is known as ‘quantum speedup’.
A fascinating question, assuming that they indeed have this ability,27 regards exactly which
physical features of quantum systems are responsible for it. We will not be discussing this question
further here.28 Rather, let us return to Gödel’s question regarding the resources required to solve
the restricted form of the Entscheidungsproblem. Could a quantum computer be used to solve
NP-complete problems such as this one efficiently? It turns out that a quantum computer can
yield a performance improvement over a standard TM with respect to such problems. Recall (see
def. 2) that a language L is in NP if there is a TM, C, such that x ∈ L iff there is a certificate u
whose length is polynomial with respect to the length of x, that if fed to C can be used by C to
verify x’s membership in L in polynomial time. If in addition, in polynomial time, for any given x,
C can itself either find such a suitable certificate, or determine that one does not exist, then L is
also in P.
Let the question be, ‘Does the string x of length n have a “proof”, i.e. a certificate, of length
27There is strong evidence (some of which we will discuss shortly), however there is still no
proof, that quantum computers can efficiently solve more problems than classical computers can.
28In (10), the partial amplitudes contributing to the |0〉 component of the state vector cancel
each other out. Many quantum algorithms include similar transitions, leading some to view
quantum interference as the source of quantum speedup (Fortnow, 2003), although others have
questioned whether interference is a truly quantum phenomenon (Spekkens, 2007). The fact that
some quantum algorithms appear to spawn parallel computational processes has led to the idea of
‘quantum parallelism’ as the primary contributing mechanism (Duwell, 2007, forthcoming), and to
the related but distinct idea that this processing occurs in parallel physical universes
(Hewitt-Horsman 2009; for a criticism see Aaronson 2013b; Cuffaro 2012). Others view quantum
entanglement (Cuffaro, forthcoming a, forthcoming b; Steane 2003), or quantum contextuality
(Howard et al., 2014), as providing the answer. Still others view the structure of quantum logic as
the key (Bub, 2010).
≤ nk?’, for some constant k. The number of possible certificates ui is N = 2nk . Assuming the
space of certificates is unstructured, C will need O(N) steps to decide whether x is in L; the
computer will run through the possible certificates ui one by one, testing each in turn to see if it is
a valid certificate for x, moving on to the next certificate if it is not. Using a quantum computer
and Grover’s quantum search algorithm (Grover, 1996), however, only O(
√
N) steps are required.
It turns out that this is the best we can do (Bennett et al., 1997). But while this quadratic
speedup is impressive, the overall running time of the quantum computer remains exponential in
the length, n, of x. Quantum computers, therefore, do not appear to allow us to affirm the
Gödelian conjecture.29
However there is evidence that the class of languages efficiently decidable by a quantum
computer is larger than that corresponding to either a deterministic or probabilistic classical
computer. To be more precise, define the class BQP, analogously to the class BPP, as the class of
languages such that there exists a polynomial-time quantum computer that will correctly
determine, with probability ≥ 2/3, whether or not a string x is in the language L. The question of
whether a quantum computer can outperform a classical computer amounts to the question of
whether BQP is larger than BPP. It is clear that BPP ⊆ BQP; one invocation of the transition
(8), for example, followed by a measurement, can serve to simulate a classical ‘coin flip’, and in
polynomial time this procedure can be used to simulate any of a given PTM’s transition
probabilities.30 As for the evidence for strict containment—i.e. for BPP ( BQP—this comes
mainly from the various quantum algorithms that have been developed.
Shor’s quantum algorithm (Shor, 1997) for integer factorisation is a spectacular example. The
best known classical factoring algorithm is the number field sieve (Lenstra et al., 1990), which
requires O(2(log N)
1/3
) steps to factor a given integer N . Popular encryption mechanisms such as
RSA (Rivest et al., 1978) rely on the assumption that factoring is hard. Yet Shor’s algorithm
requires only a number of steps that is polynomial in logN—an exponential speedup over the
29Note that above it was assumed that the space of certificates is unstructured. However it is
possible that a given NP-complete language L possesses non-trivial structure that can be exploited
to yield further performance improvements (Cerf et al., 2000). Therefore we cannot rule out that
L is efficiently decidable by a classical computer, let alone by a quantum one.
30Rather than Q, one typically uses a ‘Hadamard gate’ (H) for this purpose, which acts as
follows:
H|0〉 → 1√
2
|0〉+ 1√
2
|1〉, H|1〉 → 1√
2
|0〉 − 1√
2
|1〉.
number field sieve. There are also provable ‘oracle’ separations between the classical and quantum
computational models. An oracle is a kind of imaginary magic black box, to which one puts a
question chosen from a specified set, and from which one receives an answer in a single time step.
For example, Simon’s problem (Simon, 1994) is that of determining the period of a given function
f that is periodic under bitwise modulo-2 addition. One can define an oracle O for evaluating
arbitrary calls to f . Relative to O, Simon’s quantum algorithm requires O(n) steps, while a
classical algorithm requires O(2n). This is an exponential speedup.
None of these results are absolutely conclusive. On the one hand, not every complexity-theoretic
proposition relativises to an oracle. The result that IP = PSPACE, for example, does not hold
under certain oracle relativisations (PSPACE is the class of problems solvable using polynomially
many space resources; IP is the class of problems for which an affirmative answer can be verified
using an interactive proof). Further, there are oracles relative to which P = NP, as well as oracles
relative to which P 6= NP. Oracles are important tools that, among other things, help to simplify
and clarify the conceptual content of complexity-theoretic propositions, however they cannot be
used to resolve these and other questions (for a discussion, see Fortnow, 1994). Nor can they
definitively show that BPP ( BQP. Simon’s problem, for instance, might contain some hitherto
unknown structure, obscured by the relativisation of the problem to an oracle, that could be
exploited by a classical algorithm. Regarding Shor’s algorithm, on the other hand, unlike Simon’s,
it does not make essential use of an oracle. Yet this nevertheless does not conclusively demonstrate
that BPP ( BQP, for it is still an open question whether factoring is in BPP. While most
complexity theorists believe this to be false, their conviction is not as strong as their conviction, for
example, that P 6= NP—for the factoring problem does have some internal structure, which is in
fact exploited by the classical number field sieve algorithm (Aaronson, 2013a, 64-66).
While none of the individual pieces of evidence are conclusive, taken together they nevertheless
do lend a great deal of plausibility to the thesis that quantum computers can solve more problems
efficiently than can classical computers. That said, it is not the place here to evaluate this
evidence. For the purposes of our discussion we will assume that this thesis is true. In the next
section we will consider its consequences.
6 Quantum computing and the foundations of computational complexity theory
If BPP ( BQP, then it follows that the universality of Turing efficiency thesis is false. Some
authors view the consequences of this for complexity theory to be profound. Bernstein & Vazirani
(1997), for example, take it that the theory “rests upon” this thesis (p. 1411), and that the advent
of quantum computers forces us to “re-examine the foundations” (p. 1412) of the theory. The
sense in which complexity theory rests upon universality is expressed by Nielsen & Chuang (2000),
who write that the failure of the universality thesis implies that complexity theory cannot achieve
an “elegant, model independent form” (p. 140). Of this, Hagar (2007) writes:
To my mind, the strongest implication [of the violation of universality] is on the
autonomous character of some of the theoretical entities used in computer science, ...
given that quantum computers may be able to efficiently solve classically intractable
problems, hence re-describe the abstract space of computational complexity,
computational concepts and even computational kinds such as ‘an efficient algorithm’
or ‘the class NP’, will become machine dependent, and recourse to ‘hardware’ will
become inevitable in any analysis of the notion of computational complexity. (pp.
244–5).
Given that the universality of Turing efficiency thesis states that any reasonable model of
computation can be simulated with at most a polynomial number of extra time steps by a
(probabilistic) Turing machine, however, the reader may be understandably confused by the claim
that this thesis grounds the model-independence of complexity-theoretic concepts to begin with. At
most, it seems that only a very weak sense of model-independence follows from universality. The
truth of (4), that is, implies that any assertion, of the form ‘language L is decidable efficiently by
an instance of the reasonable machine model M’, is replaceable by the assertion that ‘language L
is decidable efficiently by a PTM’. And since ‘by a PTM’ is thus made universally applicable, it can
be omitted from all such statements in the knowledge that it is implicit (cf. Nakhnikian & Salmon,
1957). But while this yields a kind of model-independence in the sense that one need not explicitly
mention the PTM model when speaking of the complexity-theoretic characteristics of L, it remains
the case, nevertheless, that a reference to the PTM model is implicit in one’s assertions about L.
To illustrate just how weak such a notion of model-independence is, note that, based on it, one
could argue that, although quantum computing refutes the model-independence consequent upon
the universality of Turing efficiency, it at the same time provides a replacement for it (cf. Deutsch
1985, Bernstein & Vazirani 1997, p. 1413). Nielsen & Chuang (2000) write that if the universality
of Turing efficiency thesis were true, that it would be
great news for the theory of computational complexity, for it implies that attention may
be restricted to the probabilistic Turing machine model of computation. After all, if a
problem has no polynomial resource solution on a probabilistic Turing machine, then
the [universality of Turing efficiency] implies that it has no efficient solution on any
computing device. Thus, the [universality of Turing efficiency] implies that the entire
theory of computational complexity will take on an elegant, model-independent form if
the notion of efficiency is identified with polynomial resource algorithms (p. 140).
Putting aside for the moment the somewhat strange comment that an expansion of our
knowledge of the extent of the space of efficiently decidable languages is ‘bad news’ for complexity
theory, note that quite the same argument could be made if one replaces ‘probabilistic Turing
machine’ with ‘quantum computer’ and ‘universality of Turing efficiency’ with ‘universality of
quantum efficiency’. For although BPP in (4) is now replaced with BQP, we have analogously
given a characterisation, in terms of a single machine model, of
⋃
PolyM. And yet if a computer
based on the principles of quantum physics can be taken to ground an absolute
model-independent characterisation of complexity-theoretic concepts, then the right conclusion to
draw is that this is not a satisfactory notion of model-independence.31
One could, perhaps, counter that the model-independence consequent on the universality thesis
actually stems from the nature of the Turing model itself. Assuming that one is convinced by
Turing’s philosophical analysis, the Turing model does, after all, represent the conceptual essence
of effective computation (cf. Hartmanis & Stearns, 1965, p. 285). Be that as it may, there is no
reason to think that such a model must also be the most efficient one.32 The model-independence
of complexity theory thus would turn out to be a contingent fact. This in itself is not a criticism.
Nevertheless in that case it is not clear just what model-independence would contribute to the
ground of complexity theory in the theoretical sense. A ‘universality of quantum efficiency thesis’
would be, perhaps, less metaphysically satisfying from the point of view of a computer scientist,
but in itself would do just as much theoretical work as the universality of Turing efficiency thesis.
BPP ( BQP also implies the failure of the invariance thesis. Because of its supposed relation to
the Church-Turing thesis, it is universality and not invariance that has received the lion’s share of
attention from philosophers (an exception is Dean). But unlike the universality thesis, there is a
sense of model-independence built right into the very statement of invariance. After all, it
amounts to a direct claim that the particular machine model under consideration, since it can be
efficiently simulated by any other reasonable model, is irrelevant for the purposes of providing a
characterisation of the complexity of a problem. Note also that the statement of invariance itself
31One could, however, ground a relative notion of model-independence based on quantum
principles. I will discuss this further below.
32For a discussion of some possible justifications, and the problems that go along with them, for
the choice of the multi-tape TM as the benchmark for complexity-theoretic analyses, see Dean
(2016c).
makes no reference to the Turing model, so it is not susceptible to the same sort of criticism I
directed at the universality thesis above. It is true that the domain of ‘reasonable’ or physically
realisable models does not, for example, include the ‘unreasonable’ parallel computational models,
thus the invariance thesis cannot provide model-independence in a truly absolute sense. Still, the
study of efficient algorithms in particular is mainly concerned with reasonable models. So
invariance, if true, arguably provides absolute model-independence in the only sense that matters.33
Van Emde Boas takes the invariance thesis (he does not mention the universality thesis) to, as a
consequence, constitute a foundational thesis for complexity theory:
The fundamental complexity classes P and NP became part of a fundamental
hierarchy : LOGSPACE, NLOGSPACE, P, NP, PSPACE, EXPTIME, ... And again
theory faced the problem that each of these classes has a machine-dependent
definition, and that efficient simulations are needed before one can claim that these
classes are in fact machine-independent and represent fundamental concepts of
computational complexity. It seems therefore that complexity theory, as we know it
today, is based on the [assumption that the invariance thesis holds] (p. 5
van Emde Boas, 1990, ellipsis in original).
I will be criticising this statement. Before I do, however, it is important to note that it is clear
that the simplifying assumption of invariance can be profoundly useful; its truth would imply that
one can restrict one’s attention to the (reasonable) model of one’s choice when inquiring into the
complexity-theoretic characteristics of particular problems. Further, and independently of this,
studies such as van Emde Boas’s, of the extent to which one model can simulate another,
illuminate the structure of complexity theory by allowing one to characterise the space of machine
models in terms of various ‘equivalence classes’. Van Emde Boas, for instance, defines the models
comprising the ‘first machine class’ as those for which the invariance thesis holds. The ‘second
machine class’ is defined with respect to a different ‘parallel computation thesis’ (1990, p. 5),
which I will not further describe here. Note that van Emde Boas is careful to point out the partly
conventional and partly empirical (he does not use these words) nature of such theses:
The escape in defending the Invariance Thesis ... is clearly present in the word
reasonable ... For example, when in 1974 it was found that a RAM model with
unit-time multiplication and addition instructions (together with bitwise Boolean
33See Dean (2016c) for a discussion of ways to circumscribe the space of operations that should
be allowable in a reasonable model.
operations) is as powerful as a parallel machine, this model (the MBRAM) was thrown
out of the realm of reasonable (sequential) machines and was considered to be a
“parallel machine” instead. The standard strategy seems to be to adjust the definition
of “reasonable” when needed. The theses become a guiding rule for specifying the
right classes of models rather than absolute truths and, once accepted, the theses will
never be invalidated. This strategy is made explicit if we replace the word reasonable
by some more neutral phrase. (van Emde Boas, 1990, pp. 5-6).
There is much to commend in this statement. But note first that it is not clear that the
‘standard strategy’ will work in the face of quantum computing. On the one hand, one would be
hard-pressed to argue that quantum computers are not physically realisable machines. On the
other hand, the ‘quantum parallelism thesis’ (Duwell, 2007, forthcoming; Pitowsky, 1990, 2002) is
quite controversial (Cuffaro, 2012; Steane, 2003), so it is not obvious that quantum computers
should be classed as parallel rather than sequential computers. This said, even if one takes the
invariance thesis to be violated by quantum computing, the idea of it, not as an absolute truth but
as a ‘guiding rule’—a sort of intentional principle for characterising the extensions corresponding
to different equivalence classes of models—remains, and it remains a highly illuminating
methodological principle for studying the relations between computational models.
To illustrate what I mean by this,34 note that ‘quantum computer’ is actually an umbrella term
for a number of (universal) computational models: the quantum Turing model (Deutsch, 1985),
the quantum circuit model (Deutsch, 1989), the cluster-state model (Briegel et al., 2009), the
adiabatic model (Farhi et al., 2000), and many others. To date, all of these models have been
found to be computationally equivalent in the sense that they all yield the same class of problems,
BQP (see, for example, Aharonov et al., 2007; Raussendorf & Briegel, 2002; Nishimura & Ozawa,
2009). Thus it seems as though a third quantum machine class, in addition to van Emde Boas’s
first and second machine classes, exists. Fascinatingly, the differences between the first and this
third machine class turn out to be related to the differences in the physics used to describe the
machines which comprise them. The physics, in turn, informs our judgements regarding which of
these equivalence classes should be deemed as ‘reasonable’. On the basis of these judgements we
are then enabled make conclusions with regards to what is feasible for us to accomplish in the real
world (cf. Dean, 2016a, pp. 30, 56). If it were not for the existence of quantum computers, one
would be warranted in the belief that only a single reasonable machine class exists. Quantum
computing teaches us that there are at least two.
34I am indebted to Scott Aaronson and to Sona Ghosh for independently prompting the
discussion in this and the next two paragraphs.
Invariance, thought of as a guiding rule or methodological principle, rather than as a thesis, is
what is driving these investigations; through the search for equivalence classes we carve out and
illuminate the structure of the space of computational models. This yields a notion of relative
model-independence among the machine models comprising a particular class. To be clear, the
existence of relative model-independence within the conceptual structure of complexity theory is
itself not strictly speaking necessary for the theory. It is true that the theory would arguably be far
less interesting if every abstract model of computation were different from every other; for one
thing there would be no unified notion of ‘classical computation’ to compare quantum
computation with—a quantum computer would be just another model among many. Yet one can
still imagine what such a complexity theory would look like: a theory describing the computational
power of various abstract models of computation and their interrelations. This is not so alien that
it would be unrecognisable from our modern point of view.35 In fact the early period of complexity
theory, before the introduction of the polynomial principle (to be discussed below) looked much
like this. Representative of this period are results such as that by Hartmanis & Stearns (1965), for
example, who prove that the multi-tape TM model is capable of a quadratic speedup with respect
to the single-tape TM model. Such analyses are indeed still present in the modern theory.
The fact that relative model-independence does exist, on the other hand, arguably tells us
something deep, or anyway something, about how computer science connects up with the world.
The invariance principle (rather than thesis) is a vitally important part of computational
complexity theory partly for this reason. And as a methodological principle, it fulfils this role
whether it is successful in its search for equivalence classes of computational models or not. For
the lack of any relative model-independence within the theory would arguably also tell us
something about computer science’s relation to the physical world. A further, still methodological,
role of invariance is as a simplifying principle. For from a practical perspective the theory would be
exceedingly unwieldy, even if it would not strictly speaking be impossible to develop, if no
equivalence classes of abstract computational models existed.
35The very notion of an abstract model of computation presupposes some notion of
complexity-theoretic invariance, of course, without which it would be impossible to unify various
physical instantiations of a model under a single concept. I am perfectly ready to concede that if
complexity-theoretic invariance failed to hold in this minimal sense then this would be disastrous
for modern complexity theory. But then I cannot see how it would be possible to revise complexity
theory in light of this; it would seem impossible to have a theory of complexity, or indeed any
theory of any subject, if even basic abstraction were not possible.
And yet none of this seems to imply or depend upon model-independence in the sense of the
first of my quotes of van Emde Boas above. Indeed it is not clear what one gains from
model-independence in that sense. LOGSPACE, NLOGSPACE, P, NP, PSPACE, EXPTIME, and
other complexity classes are each of them classes of languages, after all. To compare any two of
them is to compare one class of languages with another; they are thus already
machine-independent in that sense. For this reason it is a meaningful question to ask whether the
class P is large enough to include all of the languages in NP, irrespective of how one defines either
of them in terms of an underlying machine model. On the other hand, one can define P as the
class of languages which are efficiently decidable by a TM. And one can define NP as the class of
languages which are efficiently decidable by an NTM. And to be sure, deeper insight is gained by
reflecting on how one translates the definition of NP given in terms of the NTM model (3), into
the alternative definition of NP given in terms of the standard TM model (2). For then one sees
clearly that the statement that P = NP amounts to the assertion that the restricted form of the
Entscheidungsproblem is efficiently solvable. But in this case it is by reflecting on the
characteristics of a particular model that one gains this insight, namely, the Turing machine model
insofar as it represents the conceptual essence of human digital computation.36
I am not alone in my skepticism. The idea that it is the fundamental goal of complexity theory
to get at some metaphysical notion of an independently existing thing called ‘efficient
computation’ is certainly not shared by all complexity theorists. For example, Fortnow (2006)
writes:
By no means does computational complexity “rest upon” a [universality of Turing
efficiency] thesis. The goals [sic.] of computational complexity is to consider different
notions of efficient computation and compare the relative strengths of these models.
Quantum computing does not break the computational complexity paradigm but
rather fits nicely within it.
Fortnow’s statement refers to the universality thesis; however it can clearly equally well be
asserted as a counter to the claimed foundational status of the invariance thesis. A quick glance at
the practice of complexity theorists seems to confirm that Fortnow is right, for since the advent of
quantum computing in the mid-1990s, complexity theory appears to have continued on in much
the same way as before. Classic textbooks such as Papadimitriou’s (1994) excellent reference,
written before Shor’s (1994) breakthrough in quantum factoring, continue to be cited frequently in
modern scholarly work; more modern textbooks such as Arora & Barak’s (2009) book include a
36This is one reason why the question whether P = NP remains interesting even if P ( BQP.
chapter on quantum computation but otherwise present the subject in much the same way as
similar textbooks always have done; BQP is just one of many classes in Aaronson’s (2016)
‘complexity zoo’. Despite the fact that the prospects for a practicable and scalable quantum
computer are improving significantly every year (Veldhorst et al., 2015), and despite the fact that
most computer scientists believe that BPP ( BQP and thus that the universality and invariance
theses are false, complexity theory—as a discipline—does not appear to be in crisis. Complexity
theory as a whole has grown—many new and important questions have arisen regarding exactly
how BQP relates to other complexity classes—but the basic conceptual framework within which
we ask these questions remains much the same as before.
But if model-independence is not constitutive of complexity theory, what is? Built into the
definition of both the universality and invariance theses is the more basic idea that an algorithm is
efficient iff it requires no more than a polynomial number of steps to complete. As we have seen,
the roots of this idea go back at least as far as Gödel’s letter to von Neumann, although from the
modern perspective, its main sources are the seminal articles of Cobham (1965) and Edmonds
(1965). I will call it the ‘polynomial efficiency principle’ or ‘polynomial principle’ for short.37 Unlike
either the universality or invariance theses, there is no question that the polynomial principle is de
facto foundational with respect to the modern framework of complexity theory, in the sense that
the conceptual structure of the theory—the definitions of and relations between its most important
complexity classes such as P, NP, BPP, BQP, and so on—depend crucially upon the principle.
And yet there is a different sense in which it can be said to be controversial. The goal of the
polynomial principle is to capture our pre-theoretic notion of what it means for an algorithm to be
efficient. Expressing this, Edmonds writes:
... my purpose is ... to show as attractively as I can that there is an efficient algorithm
[for maximum matching]. According to the dictionary, “efficient” means “adequate in
operation or performance.” This is roughly the meaning I want—in the sense that it is
conceivable for maximum matching to have no efficient algorithm. Perhaps a better
word is “good.”
I am claiming, as a mathematical result, the existence of a good algorithm for finding
a maximum cardinality matching in a graph. (Edmonds, 1965, p. 420, emphasis in
original).
37Forms of this principle are often referred to as the Cobham-Edmonds thesis (e.g., see Dean,
2016b). Unfortunately, this terminology is not always consistent. In Goldreich (2008, p. 33), for
example, the Cobham-Edmonds thesis is the name given to what we have here called the
invariance thesis.
One could argue, however, that the polynomial principle fails to achieve this goal. For example,
a problem for which the best algorithm requires O(n1000) steps to complete is considered to be
tractable according to the principle, while a problem for which the best algorithm requires
O(2n/1000) steps is considered to be intractable. Yet despite these labels, the ‘intractable’ problem
will take fewer steps to solve for all but very large values of n. Strictly speaking, of course, since it
is defined asymptotically, the principle does not yield an incorrect answer even in such cases.
However problems we are faced with in practice are invariably of bounded size, and an asymptotic
measure—the preceding example illustrates this—seems to at least sometimes be ill-suited for their
analysis. A further reason for doubting the polynomial principle is that it is a measure of
worst-case complexity. Yet it does not seem implausible that an average-case measure might give
us better insight into just how ‘good’ a given algorithm is.
All of this may be granted. And yet growth rates such as the above are extremely rare in
practice. Generally speaking, polynomial-time algorithms have growth rates with small exponents,
and the simplification made possible by the use of an asymptotic measure generally does more
good than it does harm; “For practical purposes the difference between algebraic and exponential
order is often more crucial than the difference between finite and non-finite.” (Edmonds, 1965, p.
451). We also generally do not know in advance how the inputs to a particular problem will be
distributed, and in such circumstances average case complexity analyses are impracticable (see
Papadimitriou, 1994, pp. 6-7).
What the arguments for and against the polynomial principle illustrate is that its goal is not so
much to provide an absolute or metaphysical distinction between good and bad algorithms. What
these arguments show us is that the purpose of the principle is to guide us in making such
distinctions in practice. In particular, what the arguments for the principle amount to is
the—empirical—claim that the polynomial principle has been highly successful, in the sense that it
has tended to provide us with extraordinarily good guidance for the problems with which we are
generally faced. Aaronson sums this up as follows:
Of the big problems solvable in polynomial time—matching, linear programming,
primality testing, etc.—most of them really do have practical algorithms. And of the
big problems that we think take exponential time—theorem-proving, circuit
minimization, etc.—most of them really don’t have practical algorithms. So, that’s the
empirical skeleton holding up our fat and muscle (2013a, p. 54).
The precise way in which the polynomial principle aids us in the search for good algorithms is by
providing us with a mathematical explication of ‘good’ in the context of complexity theory. In
doing so it provides us with a mathematical framework for our inquiries, within which we can
express precise questions, and generate precise answers.
... if only to motivate the search for good, practical algorithms, it is important to
realise that it is mathematically sensible even to question their existence. For one
thing the task can then be described in terms of concrete conjectures. (Edmonds,
1965, p. 451).
And yet, while the principle is generally a good guide, it is we who must ultimately decide, in
every case upon which we bring it to bear, whether or not to follow its advice.
It would be unfortunate for any rigid criterion to inhibit the practical development of
algorithms which are either not known or known not to conform nicely to the criterion.
Many of the best algorithmic ideas known today would suffer by such theoretical
pedantry. ... And, on the other hand, many important algorithmic ideas in electrical
switching theory are obviously not “good” in our sense. (Edmonds, 1965, p. 451).
Just as the polynomial principle is a practical principle, so is complexity theory a practical
science, in the sense that its fundamental aim is to inform us with regards to the practical
difficulty of computing different classes of problems—i.e. with regards to the things we would like
to do—on our various machines. Principles such as the polynomial and even the invariance
principle (insofar as it serves as a methodological principle for carving out equivalence classes of
machine models) illuminate the structure of this space of possible tasks. But they, and the
structure with it, are ultimately guides which should be set aside whenever they cease to be useful.
To some extent this is true in every science—the principles of Newtonian mechanics, say, must
give way to the principles of modern spacetime theories. But principles such as the polynomial
principle, and the theory of complexity that is built upon it, do not claim for themselves universal
validity as Newtonian mechanics at one time did—nor do they even claim to have a well-defined
sphere of application (how large must an exponent be before a polynomial-time algorithm is no
longer considered to be ‘really’ efficient?). The polynomial principle, and complexity theory with it,
are intrinsically practical in nature; they claim to be useful only ‘most of the time’ and for most of
our practical purposes. This is the theory’s core.
This said, if, with the development of the theory, the polynomial principle somehow ceased to
be useful even in merely the majority of cases of practical interest, this would certainly require a
substantial revision of much of the theory’s framework, for so much of the conceptual structure of
complexity theory is built upon the assumption of the polynomial principle. And yet even in this
case the essential nature and subject matter—the metaphysical foundation, if you will—of the
theory—a theory of what we are capable of doing in practice—would not change.
7 Conclusion
Cobham (1965) took complexity theory to be a science concerned with three general groups of
questions: those related (i) to “specific computational systems”, (ii) to “categories of computing
machines”, and (iii) to those questions which “are independent of any particular method of
computation” (pp. 24–5). The third subdivision will always remain a part of complexity theory. In
fact, machine-independent results can be had in the theory—though no one would argue that
these provide a foundation for it—if one uses a very general and amorphous notion of a complexity
measure (Seiferas, 1990). Indeed studies such as these suggest that further reflection may be
needed on precisely what is meant by the notion of ‘intrinsic complexity’. But model-independence
is not all of the theory; nor is it a foundation for the other two groups of questions mentioned by
Cobham. Computational complexity theory is, at its core, a practical science. As a mathematical
theory, it employs idealised concepts and methods, and appeals to formal principles which are
justified insofar as they are useful in providing us with practical advice regarding the problems we
aim to solve. Our solutions to such problems are implemented on particular machine models.
Computational complexity theory studies the various notions of efficiency associated with these
different models, and studies how these notions relate to one another. “Quantum computing”, to
quote Fortnow once again, “does not break the computational complexity paradigm but rather fits
nicely within it.” Indeed, far from breaking the complexity-theoretic paradigm, quantum computing
serves to remind us of the point of it all.
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